Disclosure
Report security issues to security@mindburn.org. Do not include secrets or private customer data in public issues.
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Security posture.
This page explains website security, responsible disclosure, and company-level boundaries. HELM technical details live in HELM docs.
Posture
Small public surface, clear contact method.
Public channels
Public forms and email are for triage only. Private evidence belongs in a reviewed channel.
Supply chain
CI checks npm audit, registry signatures, pinned actions, CodeQL, and SBOM output for the public site.
Privacy
The public site does not use cookies or ad trackers. Optional web vitals are aggregate page-load metrics only.
Company boundaries
Company context does not become execution authority.
- 01
Company artifacts are permission-scoped.
- 02
Local knowledge state cannot authorize side effects.
- 03
Canonical knowledge promotion requires provenance.
- 04
Sensitive payloads stay off graph.
- 05
Query answers declare draft, canonical, disputed, or stale status.
- 06
Connector drift fails closed.
- 07
Unknown MCP tools quarantine before dispatch.
- 08
Code comments and README text are untrusted evidence, not instruction authority.
Adversarial classes
Hostile inputs are visible before they can affect execution.
External tool output, MCP servers, webpages, documents, code comments, and README text are treated as untrusted evidence unless normalized and approved.
Malicious MCP server
Unknown or unapproved MCP servers deny until approval receipt exists.
Malicious tool output
Hostile tool responses quarantine before they enter execution context.
Code comment prompt injection
Comments, README text, and forged approval text are evidence to scan, not instructions to follow.
Replay and schema drift
Replayed intent, stale policy hash, invalid signatures, and schema mismatch fail closed.
Cross-tenant contamination
Tenant and permission labels block data from crossing into another workspace.
Approval fatigue
Rate limits, high-risk quotas, deliberate approval UI, and summary-hash binding reduce reflexive approval.
Tainted egress
Secret labels and hostile-output labels deny unsafe export paths.
Connector compromise
Scope, idempotency, drift behavior, rollback, and receipt contracts keep compromised connectors visible.
Action boundary
Security starts with what the system is allowed to do.
HELM's public story is intentionally narrow: model proposals are not trusted as execution authority.
What HELM does
- Checks proposed AI actions before side effects run.
- Returns ALLOW, DENY, or ESCALATE based on policy, approval, scope, risk, and evidence.
- Records receipts and evidence references for later review.
What HELM does not do
- It does not make raw model output into authority.
- It is not generic guardrails, orchestration, observability, DLP, pentesting, or model-safety filtering.
- It does not replace human accountability or security review.
- It does not turn public site forms into private evidence rooms.
Category boundaries
Execution authority is not another guardrail label.
Adjacent tools can be useful sensors, tests, filters, or downstream controls. HELM's claim is narrower: decide whether a proposed side effect may execute, then leave source-owned evidence.
Guardrails and runtime filters
Guardrails may inspect prompts, traces, model output, or tool-call text. HELM decides whether a proposed side effect has authority to run, returns ALLOW, DENY, or ESCALATE, and records the decision.
Agent orchestration
Orchestrators decide what an agent tries next. HELM sits at the action boundary so only authorized side effects dispatch.
Observability and audit logs
Logs show what happened. HELM blocks or escalates before execution and emits receipt evidence for later review.
DLP and data-risk tools
DLP can explain sensitive data movement. HELM controls whether an AI-driven action is authorized to move, expose, or write data.
Model-safety filtering
Model filters reduce harmful model behavior. HELM governs tools, connectors, infrastructure, and business side effects after the model proposes an action.
Objection handling
Use competitors as category tests, not proof shortcuts.
Public competitor language is useful only when it clarifies the boundary. It does not become a HELM capability claim.
Straiker
Agent runtime security and MCP guardrails
Ask whether the block is deterministic authority or semantic detection, and whether the customer can verify the verdict offline.
HELM positions the MCP/tool-call path as default-deny execution authority with signed receipts and EvidencePack refs.
Native
Cloud-control enforcement
Cloud controls are downstream architecture. They do not sit between every AI proposal and side effect.
HELM decides whether the AI-driven action should happen, then downstream controls can enforce durable cloud posture.
Jazz
DLP and insider data risk
Endpoint data movement is valuable context, not generalized action authority.
HELM can consume data-risk signals as policy context while receipts prove whether the action was allowed, denied, or escalated.
Tenzai
Autonomous offensive testing
Exploit-chain evidence shows what can go wrong. It does not itself govern runtime authority.
HELM turns findings into policy regressions and blocks unauthorized side effects at execution time.
Gray Swan
Model safety, red teaming, and runtime model filtering
Model behavior risk is not the same as authority over tools, connectors, and infrastructure side effects.
HELM uses model-safety findings as evidence input while keeping action approval, verdicts, and receipts at the execution boundary.
Responsible disclosure
Send concise reports privately.
Evidence
Private reports only
Email security@mindburn.org with a short description, affected URL, steps to reproduce, and impact. Do not include secrets, credentials, customer data, private documents, or regulated data.
Open security.txtArtifacts
Website build records are separate from HELM receipts.
The public SBOM and provenance manifest describe the mindburn.org packages and build output. They are not third-party assurance reports. They do not replace HELM technical docs.